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COMMENTS
of judicial decisions. Such a result would seem to be dictated
by the clear language of Section 1053 of the Revised Statutes of
1870, and by the jurisprudence in other jurisdictions to the effect
that an attempt is generic and a lesser-included degree of the
basic crime. GEORGE D. ERNEST, JR.
RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF AN OVERRULING DECISION
In Succession of Lambert,' the most recent Louisiana case on
the vexing problem of conjoint legacy, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana overruled certain of its prior cases on the subject.2 The
argument that a changed interpretation of the pertinent code
provisions would prejudice the property rights of those who had
relied on the overruled decisions was answered by the court with
a reiteration of the doctrine of Norton v. Crescent City Ice Manu-
facturing Company.3 The latter, while recognizing that the rule
of a case generally would be applied both retrospectively and
prospectively, announced that where vested rights had been ac-
quired in reliance upon prior decisions any case overruling the
latter would be given prospective effect only.
All systems of law recognize the necessity for some adher-
ence to judicial precedent. A clash occurs only with respect to
the weight to be accorded the authority of the decided case. The
force of judicial precedent depends upon the extent to which
each judicial system is willing to subordinate the necessity of
modification of legal rules in accordance with social and economic
changes to the desiderata of certainty and predictability in the
law.4
In the main, three distinct theories obtain as to the force of
judicial precedent.5 Under the English rule of stare decisis, a
prior case directly in point has the same force and effect upon
the court which decided it and on all inferior tribunals as a sta-
tute, unless and until overruled by a higher court. If -the prior
case was decided by the House of Lords, the point decided be-
comes the law of England, which can only be overturned legis-
latively by an act of Parliament. Judicial precedent, even of the
single case, is law de jure which all inferior courts are obliged
1. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37,997 (June 14, 1946).
2. For a treatment of the substantive law presented in the Lambert case,
see Case Note, infra p. 138.
3. 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933).
4. For an excellent discussion of the various aspects of this problem,
see Goodhart, Case Law in England and America (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 173.
5. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law (1934).
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to follow, and which cannot be overruled even by the court which
originally announced the rule.,
The continental concept of judicial precedent presents the
other extreme. Case precedent was given little weight in France
following the great codifications. Under the then accepted theory,
cases were to be decided only under the code provisions and
analogical extensions thereof. It was then felt that there was
little need of case law. While in more recent years judicial pre-
cedent has played an increasingly important role, it is still re-
garded as possessing persuasive rather than authoritative force.
Under the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, where a line of
decisions are all to the same effect, the jurisprudence will be
followed, not because of any compelling or binding force, but
under the theory that the jurisprudence thus established and ap-
plied is usually accepted as correct.7
The doctrine of stare decisis as applied generally by Ameri-
can courts occupies a mean position between these two extremes.,
While the great majority of the United States formally adopted
the common law, yet in America the institution of unwritten law
did not gain such rigid adherence as in England. The English
theory of judicial precedent, workable in a single jurisdiction
with a highly centralized system of courts, presented difficulties
when applied in the various common law jurisdictions of Am-
erica. The continental concept of judicial precedent, with its al-
lowance for flexibility in legal thought and possibilities for a
more rapid evolution of the law, is thought by one student of
the subject to be slowly penetrating American common law
jurisdictions.9 According to this author, the English and Am-
erican doctrines of judicial precedent are at the parting of the
ways." In contrast with the English rule, under the American
doctrine of stare decisis, it is the line of cases all to the same
effect, rather than the single case, which affords the authority
of judicial precedent. And even then, American courts have
never considered that they were without the power to overrule
their own prior decisions; and they have not been too hesitant
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 11; Daggett, Dainow, Hebert and McMahon, A Reappraisal Ap-
praised: A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana (1937) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 12,
15-17.





to overturn a long line of cases to reject an outmoded theory
deemed inimical to the public interests.1'
It has been asserted that Louisiana is closer to the continen-
tal doctrine of jurisprudence constante than to either the English
or the American doctrines of stare decisis.'12 Similar to the Am-
erican concept of judicial precedent, in Louisiana "more than
one decision of the supreme judicial tribunal is required to settle
the jurisprudence on any given point or question of law."'Is Ju-
dicial precedent in this civilian jurisdiction has never been any-
thing more than law de facto.'
4
While the lesser weight previously accorded judicial prece-
dent in Louisiana offered greater opportunities for necessary
modification of jurisprudential rules, it achieved this only by
sacrificing to some extent relative legal certainty and predicta-
bility. In the Norton and Lambert cases, the court appeared to
be groping for a workable compromise between the competing
objectives of opportunity for jurisprudential development and
the need for stability in the law.
Simultaneously, other American jurisdictions have been
striving to achieve similarly a solution of the problem. In 1932,
on the authority of a prior case, the Supreme Court of Montana
sustained a recovery by a shipper for an overcharge by a carrier,
but at the same time expressly overruled the prior case and an-
nounced that it would not be followed in the future. 5 The over-
ruling decision was given the same prospective effect only as that
ordinarily resulting from a legislative change in the law. The
same court affirmed its new rule of judicial precedent a few
months later, 6 the second case being affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court under certiorari. 17 In upholding the con-
stitutionality of Montana's new rule of judicial precedent, Mr.
Justice Cardozo as the organ of the court said:
"We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the
subject. A state in defining the limits of adherence to prece-
11. Perhaps the most striking illustration is the overruling of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842), and the long line of cases bottomed
thereon by the Supreme Court of the United States in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 787, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
12. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert and McMahon, supra note 7, at 23.
13. Smith v. Smith, 13 La. 441, 445 (1839).
14. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert and McMahon, supra note 7, at 23.
15. Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 91 Mont. 194, 7
P.(2d) 919 (1932).
16. Sunburst Oil & Refg. Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.
(2d) 927 (1932).
17. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53
S.Ct. 145, 148 (1932).
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dent may make a choice for itself between the principle of
forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say
that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are
law none the less for intermediate transactions."
The Montana rule of the prospective effect of an overruling
decision has been heralded by many advocates of law reform in
America as a panacea for all ills resulting from adherence to
judicial precedent.' In the relatively short time since the first
of the Montana cases was decided, the new rule of judicial pre-
cedent has gained a surprising acceptance in American jurisdic-
tions.19 Skeptics, however, have not been backward in challeng-
ing the validity of any assumption that the doctrine of prospec-
tive effect of an overruling decision is a nostrum for all the ills
of the judicial system. 20 Four specific objections to the worka-
bility of the new rule have been advanced,21 one of which is so
serious as to require consideration despite the limited scope of
this comment.
One of the advantages claimed for the Montana doctrine is
that it "gives no advantage to the party who succeeds in having
an earlier case overruled."22 Precisely because of this it is argued
that a prospective effect only of an overruling decision removes
all incentive to seek the overruling of the prior erroneous case.28
If this argument possesses complete validity, of course, as a prac-
tical matter the new rule of judicial precedent ultimately may
crystallize into the most rigid type of stare decisis. But at least
one counterargument appears. Ordinarily, the appealed case is
18. Kocourek and Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through
Stare Decisis (1935) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 971; Shartel, Stare Decisis-A Practical
View (1933) 17 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 6; Stare Decisis Freed from Baneful Effect
(1935) 19 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 37.
19. Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.(2d) 1045 (1938);
Hoven v. McCarthy Bros., 163 Minn. 339, 204 N.W. 29 (1925); State v. Haid,
327 Mo. 567, 38 S.W.(2d) 44 (1931); Bagby v. Martin, 118 Okla. 244, 247 Pac.
404 (1926); Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 Pac. 593, 39 LR.A. 594, 75 Am.
St. Rep. 904 (1898).
20. Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis. in Courts of Last Resort (1923) 37
Harv. L. Rev. 409, 410; Comment (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1403.
21. Three of these objections are set forth in Von Moschzisker, supra
note 20, at 410: (1) the rule constitutes pure legislation; (2) it removes all
incentive to seek the overruling of an erroneous precedent; and (3) declara-
tions made by the courts as to what the law would be thereafter are sheer
dicta, not binding upon the courts. A fourth objection is advanced in Com-
ment (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1403 on the ground that retroaction serves to
regulate the strength of stare decisis, which is a product of the evolution of
a workable balance between certainty in the law and its adaptability to new
demands.
22. Shartel, supra note 18, at- 7.
23. Von Moschzisker, supra note 20, at 410.
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seldom limited to a single issue or point of law; and the incen-
tive of reversal on other points not only would give counsel an
opportunity to challenge the prior case without cost, but would
give an alert court the opportunity to overrule outmoded deci-
sions even though the matter be labored feebly by counsel. The
Louisiana rule, being limited to the impairment of vested prop-
erty rights acquired under a reliance on the prior decisions, pre-
sents less of a limitation on the incentive to overturn the prior
cases. Further, under the review of the facts by the appellate
ccurts in Louisiana, a greater opportunity is presented for over-
ruling outmoded principles not vigorously challenged by counsel.
Clarification and delineation of the doctrine of the Norton
and Lambert cases appear necessary. In view of the Louisiana
concept of judicial precedent heretofore, it seems somewhat
doubtful whether the rule of the prospective effect of an over-
ruling decision will be applied when only a single case is over-
ruled, as well as when a line of prior cases is overturned. Further,
the precise limits of the nebulous language "vested property
rights" remain to be fixed. Despite this, however, it is probable
that Louisiana, like a few of its sister states, has taken a long
step forward toward a more workable solution of the eternal
dilemma which confronts all courts-the difficulty of adapting
the law to new demands and yet maintaining a relative legal
certainty. MARTHA E. KIRK
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